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ARGUMENT 
I The State Failed To Dispute The Facts Supporting The 
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss In The Lower Court 
The State does not dispute the Defendants' "Statement of Relevant 
Facts" on appeal, but instead sets up its own statement of facts. Compare, 
Aplnt. Br. 12-17 and Aplee. Br. 5-7. As in the lower court, the State 
attempts to sever the use of peyote by members of the Defendant Oklevueha 
Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah and its spiritual leaders, the 
Defendants James and Linda Mooney, from its religious context and to cast 
doubt on the propriety of the Defendants' religious beliefs and practices. Id. 
Although the State implies that the Defendant James Mooney is not 
of Native American Indian descent, Aplee. Br. 7, n.5, the State presented no 
evidence in the lower court to counter the Defendant Mooney's sworn 
affidavit regarding his Native American ancestry, his membership in the 
non-federally recognized Seminole Tribe, his long participation as a member 
and spiritual leader in the Native American Church, or his legal authori-
1 The worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament by Native American Church 
members is, by its very nature and history, a religious exercise. Thus, no inquiry as 
to the depth or sincerity of belief is required. See, Snyder v. Murray City Corp.. 
2003 UT 13, U24, quoting Society of Separationists. supra, at 192 ("prayerful 
address of a deity, by its very nature, is a religious exercise... No inquiry as to the 
depth or sincerity of belief is required.") 
zation to obtain peyote for the Defendant Church. See, 1fl|4-6, Aplnl. Br. 14. 
Likewise, in the lower court, the State did not contest Defendant Linda 
Mooney's sworn affidavit regarding her history of participation and 
leadership in the Native American Church. See, fflj 1,5, Aplnt. Br. 13. 
The State represents that the facts in its "Statement of Facts" are 
"from the preliminary hearing testimony and the trial court's ruling on 
defendant's motion to dismiss", Aplee. Br. 5, n. 3, as if such "facts" were 
presented in opposition to the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss in the lower 
court. However, this portrayal is unfounded. The State did not dispute any of 
the seventeen paragraphs of undisputed facts supporting the Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss in the lower court. Aplnt. Br. 12, n.4.2 Thus, the State 
does not cite to its memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion To 
2 The State represents that it "claims" to have evidence that some members of the 
Defendant Native American Church were given "maintenance doses" of peyote 
which they carried away from Church ceremonies, as support for its spurious claim 
that Church members were engaging in the non-religious use of peyote. Aplee. Br. 6, 
n.4. However, the carrying of peyote on the person of a Native American Church 
member is part of Native American Church religious belief and practice. The only 
court to consider this issue held that the practice was protected by the First 
Amendment and dismissed the criminal prosecution against the defendant 
predicated on such practice. See, Whitehorn v. State. 1977 OK CR 65,561 P.2d 539, 
547-548 (1977). 
Dismiss in the lower court. Aplee. Br. 5-7. 
On appeal, the State concedes that the multiple racketeering and 
felony drug charges against the Defendants, arise from their conduct f,in 
acquiring, disseminating, and using peyote in conjunction with the operation 
of the (Defendant) Church", Aplee. Br. 4, and that the Defendant Church has 
"NAC status." Aplee. Br. n.5, at 7-8. The State also does not dispute that the 
Defendant Native American Church is open to all individuals, regardless of 
their race, or political status as a member, or non-member, of a federally 
recognized tribe. See, TJ3, Aplnt. Br. 13-14. 
II The Utah Controlled Substances Act Incorporates The Federal 
Exemption From Criminal Prosecution For The Religious Use 
Of Peyote By Members Of the Native American Church 
Without Regard To Their Race Or Membership In A Federally 
Recognized Tribe 
3 In its memorandum in opposition to the Defendants9 Motion To Dismiss in the 
lower court, Case No. 36, R. 171-175, the State alleged that the Defendants James 
and Linda Mooney, "in their capacities as principals of OENAC repeatedly met 
with groups averaging about 10 to 15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule One 
controlled substance to those groups of people/' See, Case No. 36, R. 235-236. The 
Defendants directly contested this allegation in their Reply Memorandum, with 
sworn affidavits of the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, stating they had 
provided peyote to members of the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church 
in bona fide Church ceremonies in their capacities as spiritual leaders of the 
Church, Case No. 36, R. 254-255,237-246. Thus, the State's arguments, and the 
lower court's findings, that: "Defendants, in support of their memorandum, recite 
no facts", and that "Defendants failed to take issue with the facts recited in the 
State's written response," Ruling, Aplnt. Br., Add. 1 at 2, are contrary to the 
evidence of record in the lower court, and do not support the State's belated, non-
evidentiary attack on the credibility of the facts alleged by Defendants in support of 
their motion to dismiss in the lower court. Aplee. Br. 7, n. 5. 
-* 
The State provides no evidence, statutory analysis, or legal authority, 
disputing the Defendants' assertion that the federal exemption to Schedule I 
of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, which 
provides an exemption from criminal prosecution for the nondrug, religious 
use of peyote by members of the Native American Church in bona fide 
religious ceremonies (hereinafter "the federal exemption"), is incorporated 
by reference in §5 8-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
Compare, Argument, Point I, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 27-29, and Argument, Point 
I, Aplee. Br. 8, 11-13. Additionally, the State fails to counter the 
Defendants' evidence that 28 States have incorporated the federal exemption 
for the religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church" 
in their controlled substances laws, either expressly or in substance. 
Compare, Aplnt. Br. 27-29 and Aplee. Br. 11-13. 
Finally, the State's argument that the federal exemption is an 
administrative regulation that is "not binding on state courts", Aplee. Br. 18-
19, is inapplicable where, as here, Utah and 27 other States have freely 
chosen to adopt the federal exemption expressly, or in substance, in their 
Controlled Substances Acts. See, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 27-29. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should hold that the federal 
exemption contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is incorporated in the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter "the Utah Statutory Exemption"), 
and that members of the Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American 
Church of Utah, and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and Linda 
Mooney, are exempt from criminal prosecution under the Act, for their 
nondrug, religious use of peyote in bona fide Church ceremonies. Aplnt. 
Br. 23-24; 27-29. 
Ill The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption 
Ts Contrary To Utah Rules of Statutory Construction 
The State does not dispute that under Utah rules of statutory 
construction, "It is a 'fundamental rule' that constitutional questions should 
not be reached if the merits of the case can be determined on other than 
constitutional grounds", and that in interpreting a statute, "where the 
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the 
same to divine legislative intent." Aplnt. Br. 26-27, quoting, State In Interest 
ofA.B.,93b I'.Al 1091, 1097 (Utah App. 199/) (reviewing Utah cases). 
The State does not challenge Defendants' assertion that the language 
of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption, 
providing an exemption from criminal prosecution for the non-drug, 
religious use of peyote by "members of the Native American Church", "is 
clear and unambiguous on its face." Compare, Aplnt. Br. 25-31 and Aplee. 
Br. 8, 12. 1 hus, under Utah rules of statutory construction, there is no 
5 
reason to look beyond the plain wording of the federal exemption to discern 
its meaning in interpreting the Utah Statutory Exemption. Aplnt. Br. 25-31. 
The State also fails to answer Defendants' contention that the fact that 
the Utah Legislature determined to provide an exemption from criminal 
prosecution for the nondrug, religious use of peyote by Native American 
Church members, when more than 20 states do not, and that the Utah 
Legislature opted to incorporate the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. 
§1307.31, rather than the more restrictive exemptions adopted by some 
States,4 indicates that the Utah Legislature desired a broad exemption for 
"members of the Native American Church" that would be consistent with the 
expansive guarantees of freedom of religious belief and practice established 
in the Utah Constitution, to ensure that all members of the Native American 
Church are free to engage in their religious ceremonies and practices as fully 
as other inhabitants of the State of Utah, without fear of government 
interference and criminal prosecution. See, Aplnt. Br. 35-56. 
Similarly, the State does not counter the Defendants' argument that 
affording the Utah Statutory Exemption its plain and obvious meaning as 
applying to all "members of the Native American Church", honors the Utah 
rule of construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional conflicts, whereas the 
4 See, Aplnt. Br., at 27, n. 6 (citing restrictive state exemptions). 
6 
State's racial and politically restrictive interpretation of the Exemption, 
subjects members of the Native American Church to criminal prosecution 
for the exercise of their fundamental religious beliefs and mode of worship, 
solely on the unrelated criteria of their race and political status (lack of 
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe), in violation of their 
rights under the free exercise and anti-establishment provisions of Article I, 
sections 1, and 4; Article HI, section 1; the equal operation of laws provision 
contained in Article I, section 24, and the due process of law provision in 
Article I, section /, of the Utah Constitution See, Argument, Point il, 
Aplnt. Br. 35-59; see also, Provo City Corp. v. State. 795 P.2d 1120,1125 
(Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statues to avoid constitutional 
conflicts.") 
Although the State claims that "the definition of'Native American 
Church' in 21 ( I K. i>l Ur U 'is not free from doubt'", Aplee. Br. 20, 
(emphasis supplied) this statement is inaccurate. There is no definition of 
the term "Native American Church" in 21 C.F.R.§ 1307.31. None is 
necessary because the Native American Church is a well-established 
religion, combining elements of Christianity with traditional Native 
American beliefs involving the worship of peyote as a deity and the 
sacramental use of peyote in irligious rites and ceremonies. See, 
7 
United States v. Boyll 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-1337 (N.M. 1991). 
The State's interpretation of the language "members of the Native 
American Church" in the federal exemption incorporated in the Utah 
Statutory Exemption, as excluding non-Indians, and all Native American 
Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, represents a 
radical departure from the plain language of the federal exemption 
incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption, and thus should be rejected 
under Utah rules of statutory construction.5 
IV Federal Law Does Not Control The Interpretation Of The 
Utah Statutory Exemption 
The State argues that, "Nothing in Utah's laws suggest that, to the 
extent the regulatory exemption was incorporated (in Utah law), it was to be 
given any broader interpretation than that provided by the federal govern-
ment." Aplee. Br. 8. This argument is unsupported and fails to meet the 
Defendants' contention that once the federal exemption contained in 21 
C.F.R. §1307.31 was incorporated in §58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, it became a Utah law (the "Utah Statutory 
5 The States' reliance on the comment of BNDD official, Mr. Haislip, during the 
1994 hearings on AIRFAA, that members of the NAC are "required to be Native 
American", Aplee. Br., is misplaced. No evidence was offered by Mr. Haislip to 
support his opinion and it is contrary to the findings of several courts which reached 
the opposite conclusion based upon the testimony of NAC leaders, members and 
historians, that most NAC chapters welcome members of all races. See, Boyll, supra, 
at 1338-1339 (citing cases). 
8 
Exemption"), and thus subject to a different interpretation than the federal 
exemption it incorporates, based upon the Utah Legislature's considered 
approach to the subject matter of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Utah rules 
of statutory construction, as well as the limitations imposed on the 
construction of the Utah Statutory Exemption by the unique anti-
establishment, free exercise, and equal operation of laws, provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. See, Aplnt. Br. 23-24, 25-29; 49-59; see also, Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (1989) (Utah's equal 
operation of laws provision may require stricter scrutiny than the equal 
protection clause of federal constitution.) 
Although the State argues that "federal case law" reaffirms the alleged 
"intent" of Congress to restrict the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 
to Native American Indians "who are members of federally recognized 
tribes", Aplee. Br. 8, the State cites no federal cases that support this 
argument. See, Aplee. Br., passim. This argument is also belied by the fact 
that in United States v. Bovll. 774 F. Supp. 1333, (D.N.M. 1991), decided 
21 years after the enactment of the federal exemption in 1970, the United 
States did not contend tli.il the federal exemption was limited to Native 
American Indians who were " members of a federal l\ recognized Tribe." 
Instead, the United States only contended, albeit unsuccessfully, that the 
9 
exemption granted in 21 C.F.R.§ 1307.31, was limited to Indian members of 
the Native American Church. See, Bovll, supra, at 1335 ("The United States 
adopts a racially restrictive reading of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, arguing that the 
protection contained therein applies only to members of the Native 
American Church who are Indian.") Thus, the State fails to present any 
persuasive evidence to demonstrate that the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. 
§1307.31 was intended to encompass only Indian members of the Native 
American Church who are members of a federally recognized tribe. See, 
Aplnt.Br.31-34.6 
The cases cited by the State in support of its argument that the federal 
exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 is intended to exclude members of all 
races other than Native American Indian, including Pevote Way Church of 
God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) and United States v. 
Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1989), Aplee. Br. 16-17, erroneously 
relied on the membership requirements of the Native American Church of 
North America chapter of the Native American Church, that restricted its 
6 It was not until the passage of AIRFAA in 1994, that the federal government 
first clearly articulated an intent to protect from criminal prosecution for their 
religious use of peyote, at least those members of the Native American Church who 
are members of federally recognized tribes. However, AIRFAA is inclusive, not 
exclusive, and did not repeal the broader exemption for "members of the Native 
American Church" under 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 or the state law exemptions which 
permit the religious use of peyote by all "members of the Native American Church." 
See, Argument, Point VI, infra, at 16. 
10 
membership to Native American Indians, when, in fact, historical data, 
expert testimony and the testimony of leaders and members of other Native 
American Church chapters, establish that each chapter of the Native 
American Church is free to determine its own membership, and that the vast 
majority of Native America Church chapters, welcome members of all races 
who accept the fundamental beliefs and practices of the Native American 
Church. See, BoyJl, 774 F. Supp. 1333,1336-1339 (D.N.M. 1991), (MBoyJT) 
"7 
(distinguishing cases). 
The State also fails to acknowledge that the federal district court in 
Boyll supra, applying canons of federal statutory construction similar to 
those employed by Utah courts, held that the language, "members of the 
Native American Church" in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, which is now incorporated 
in the Utah Statutory Exemption, "is clear and unambiguous", and that "had 
7 The State's claim that the remarks of BNDD representative, Mr. Sonnenreich, 
during the 1970 Congressional hearings on the federal exemption, indicate that the 
federal exemption was intended to extend only to Indian members of the Native 
American Church, Aplee. Br. 24, is misplaced. Mr. Sonnenreich stated that the 
BNDD considered the Native American Church to be "sui generis", [because]"the 
history and tradition of the [Native American] church is such that there is no 
question but that they regard peyote as a deity as it were." Such history and 
tradition was apparently lacking in the non-Indian Church to which the BNDD had 
decided to deny an exemption. See, Boyll, supra, at 1139, (citing Sonnenreich's 
remarks as support for a non-racially limited interpretation of the federal 
exemption); see also, Native American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. 
Supp. 1247,1249-1254 (2nd Cir. 1980), (rejecting the government's argument that 
Sonnenreich's remarks support a racially restrictive interpretation of federal 
exemption and citing other testimony supporting a racially inclusive interpretation 
of the federal exemption). 
11 
the intent been to exclude non-Indian members, ... the language of the 
exemption would have clearly so provided." See, Aplnt. Br. 29-34, quoting 
Boyll, supra, at 1338-1340; see also, Native American Church of New York 
v. United States. 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff d, 633 F.2d 205 
(2nd Cir. 1980) (rejecting the argument that the federal exemption should 
apply to Indian churches alone); Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415,416-417 (9th Cir. 1972), (rejecting the 
Government's proposed racial reading of the exemption: "[We] cannot say 
that the Government has a lesser or different interest in protecting the health 
of Indians than it has in protecting the health of non-Indians.ff)8 
The State also fails to address BoyHfs finding that to construe the 
racially neutral language of the exemption to provide only racially discrim-
inatory protection, would place the exemption unnecessarily in direct 
conflict with the First Amendment, and violate the canon of statutory 
8 The State's criticism of Judge Burciaga's decision in Boyll as "making no 
attempt to reconcile his position with any other court's contrary position", Aplee. 
Br. 23, is unfounded. In Boyll, Judge Burciaga discusses and distinguishes the 
earlier cases cited by the State in support of its racially restrictive interpretation of 
the Utah Statutory Exemption, including Smith and Peyote Way, and acknowledges 
their contrasting views. See, Boyll, at 1339 ("While there may exist some legitimate 
support for the argument that Congress never intended to extend the exemption to 
non-Native American Church members, see Peyote Way Church of God v. Thorn-
burgh ..."); Boyll, at 1341 (discussing and distinguishing the factual and legal 
reasons for the application of the "rational basis" review in Smith, and the 
"compelling interest" test applicable to the analysis of 21 C.F.R. §1307.31.) 
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construction that federal statutes are to be construed as to avoid serious 
doubts of their constitutionality." See, Boyll, supra, at 1339-1341. 
V The Federal Government's Duty To Federally Recognized 
Tribes Is Not Germane To The Interpretation Of The Utah 
Statutory Exemption 
The State argues that its racially and politically restrictive interpre-
tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption should be sustained on the basis of 
the federal government's treaties, guardian-ward relationship with, and 
concomitant duties towards, federally recognized Indian tribes, Aplee. Br. 
9-10,13-21. However, the State of Utah has no independent constitutional 
authority to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes. 
Under the federal constitution, it is Congress that has a constitu-
tionally based and unique relationship with federally recognized Indian 
tribes, not the States. See, U.S. Const. Article VII1 11 3 ("Congress shall 
have the power ...[3.] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.") Thus, the State of 
Utah has no "compelling interest" in adopting a racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption which would limit 
') The State criticizes Boyjl's treatment of the history of the Native American 
Church as "cursory and selective." Aplee. Br. 23. However, Judge Burciaga relied 
on the testimony of eminent experts and affidavits of Native American Church 
leaders, in concluding that the majority of Native American Church chapters do not 
exclude non-Indians. See, Boyll, supra, at 1335-1338, and n. 2-4. 
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the exemption from criminal prosecution for the religious use of peyote only 
to those members of the Native American Church who are members of 
federally recognized tribes. See, In re Santos Y.. 92 Cal App. 4th 1274, 1317 
(2001), ("California has no independent state interest with respect to the 
family relations of members of federally recognized tribes. It is Congress 
that has a constitutionally based and unique relationship with federally 
recognized Indian Tribes.") 
The State also fails to address Defendants' argument that the State's 
reliance on the line of federal cases based on Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 
535, 551-55 (1974),10 to support a racially and politically restrictive reading 
of the Utah Statutory Exemption, Aplee. Br. 16-17, is misplaced, in light of 
the United States Supreme Court's watershed decision in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). There, the United States 
Supreme Court reviewed its prior equal protection clause decisions, and held 
that henceforth, state and federal courts must apply "strict scrutiny" review 
to all racial classifications. In Adarand. the Court rejected arguments similar 
10 See. Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 957 F.2d 32.33 (1st Cir. 
1992), Aplee. Br. 27, and Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornbureh. 922 F.2dl210 
(5th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1989), cited 
Aplee. Br. 16-17, 22. 
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to those previously asserted by the federal government in Mancari, where 
the government argued that: (1) the BIA employment preference for 
members of federally recognized tribes was "political" and not "racial", 
because the employment preference related solely to Native American 
Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes, and not to Native 
American Indians as a group, and that (2) Congress had special power to 
legislate on behalf of federally recognized tribes. Post-Adarand cases 
indicate that if the rationale of Mancari survives at all, it pertains only to 
statutes which involve "uniquely Indian concerns" and are "narrowly 
tailored" to achieve those concerns. See, Argument, Point XIII, infra, at 34 
(citing cases).' • 
nl Mi pi ,il I IK I lu l l M i i i p l i o i i 
The State fails to counter Defendants' argument that AIRFAA is 
inclusive, not exclusive, and that the only effect of AIRFAA was to prohibit 
the States from criminally prosecuting members of federally recognized 
Indian tribes for their religious use of peyote in Native American Church 
11 Although the State faults Boyll for failing to discuss Morton v. Mancari. Aplee. 
Br. 23, the government never raised Mancari in Boyll. Additionally, Boyll involved a 
challenge to the federal exemption under the "free exercise" clause of the First 
Amendment, rather than an "equal protection" challenge under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to which Mancari pertains. See, Argument, Point XIII, infra, at 34. 
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ceremonies. Compare, Aplnt. Br. 45-49 and Aplee. Br. 15-17. In this regard, 
AIRFAA simply provides that: (1) "Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law,... the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United 
States or any State." See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (b)(1), (Emphasis 
supplied), Aplnt. Br. 14. Under AIRFAA, the term "Indian" is defined as a 
member of a federally recognized tribe. See, Id., 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (c)(l)(2). 
"Congress does not legislate in a vacuum", Thinking Machines Corp. 
v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. #1 (In re Thinking Machines). 67 F.3d 1021, 
1025 (1st Cir. 1995), and Congress was well aware of the existence of the 
federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31 and the twenty eight state law 
exemptions at the time AIRFAA was enacted. See, AIRFAA, 42 U.S.C. 
§1996a(a)(2)(3), Aplnt. Br., Add. 14. Thus, had Congress intended to repeal 
the broader exemption for "members of the Native American Church" in 21 
C.F.R. §1307.31, or the 28 state law exemptions that incorporate the federal 
exemption expressly or in substance, such intent would be plainly expressed 
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in AIRFAA.12 
Because the Utah Statutory Exemption, encompassing all "members of 
the Native American Church", is more expansive than the exemption granted 
in AIRFAA for members of the Native American Church who are also 
members of a federally recognized tribe, all individuals exempted from 
criminal prosecution under AIRFAA are also exempt under the Utah 
Statutory Exemption. Accordingly, the State's claim that AIRFAA should be 
read as a back-handed repeal of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is 
unwarranted and should be rejected. The State's restrictive interpretation of 
the Exemption should also be rejected because such an interpretation 
unnecessarily puts AIRFAA at constitutional loggerheads with the Equal 
Operation of Laws provision of Article 1, section 24, of the Utah 
Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See, Argument, Point IX and Point XIV, infra, at 22 and 34. 
12 The comment of BNDD official, Mr. Haislip, that AIRFAA would "make 
statutory the protection now provided by federal regulation and the laws of 28 
States for the religious use of peyote by 'Indian practitioners'", Aplee. Br. 21, 
although accurate, ignores the fact that the exemptions of many of the 28 states he 
references, encompass all members of the Native American Church, and not just 
Indian members of the Church, or Indians who are also members of federally 
recognized tribes. See, Aplnt. Br. 27-29, n. 7-9 (discussing state law exemptions). Mr. 
Haislip's remarks also give no indication that AIRFAA is intended to repeal any of 
these more expansive state law exemptions or the federal exemption in 21 C.F.R. 
§1307.31. 
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Although the State argues that AIRFAA indicates that a racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is 
necessary to advance the "federal government's compelling interest" in 
fulfilling its duty to protect the culture and religion of Indians who are 
members of federally recognized tribes, Aplee. Br. 15-17, 18, n.8, the 
Defendants have previously demonstrated that the State of Utah has no 
such "compelling interest" because it is the federal government that has the 
constitutional responsibility for legislating on behalf of federally recognized 
tribes. See, Aplnt. Br. 13. Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit recently held that the federal government failed to show that its 
regulation denying access to eagle feathers by Indians who were not 
members of a federally recognized tribe was "the least restrictive 
alternative" to advance the federal government's trust relationship and duties 
toward federally recognized tribes. Accordingly, the Court held that the 
regulation denied the "free exercise" rights of Native Americans who are not 
members of a federally recognized tribe to use eagle feathers for religious 
purposes. See, United States v. Hardman, 297 F.2d 1116,1128-1129, 1133-
1134 (10th Cir. 2002), vacating, rehearing and affirming In the Matter of 
Saenz, No. 00-2166 (10th Cir. 2001), Aplnt. Br. 46-48, 64-65. Thus, in the 
case at bar, the State has not delineated any "compelling interest" of the 
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State of Utah in adopting a racially and politically restrictive interpretation 
of the Utah Statutory Exemption that would override the rights of members 
of the Defendant Native American Church who are not Native American 
Indians, or who are not members of a federally recognized Indian tribe, to 
freely exercise their fundamental religious right to worship peyote as a deity 
and sacrament within the State of Utah. 
Finally, the State's contention that it has found "no federal court 
opinions issued after AIRFAA's enactment which have extended the federal 
peyote exemption to non-Indians, Aplee. Br. 25, is untenable, because the 
State fails to cite any case in which a federal court has been asked to do so. 
VII The Constitutional Claims Presented In This Appeal Were 
Preserved In The Lower Court And The State Agreed 
To Their Adjudication Based Upon The Exceptional 
Circumstances Advanced By Defendants 
Although the State argues that the Defendants have failed to preserve 
their claims that the racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption violates the anti-establishment and free exercise 
provisions of Article I, sections land 4; Article III, section 1; the equal 
operation of the laws provisions of Article I, section 24; and the due process 
of law provisions of Article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, Aplee. Br. 
45-49, these issues were preserved in the lower court, and the State agreed to 
the determination of these issues based on the exceptional circumstances 
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asserted by Defendants in support of their petition for this interlocutory 
appeal. See, Preservation of Issues For Review In The District Court, Aplnt. 
Br. 5.13 
On October 3, 2001, the Defendants filed a Petition for Permission 
To File An Interlocutory Appeal in this case, listing the Defendants' claims 
under the Utah Constitution on which Defendants proposed to appeal, and 
specifying the "exceptional circumstances" which necessitated interlocutory 
consideration of these issues. See, fflj 2,3 and 4, Petition, Add. 16, at 9-13. 
On October 26, 2001, the State responded to the Petition with a letter 
to the Court indicating that the State "does not oppose the granting of the 
petition on the question of whether provisions of the U.S. and Utah Consti-
tutions, as well as state and federal statutes, prohibit the prosecution of non-
Indian members of the Native American Church on charges or drug 
possession and distribution ... The State therefore does not oppose the 
petition with respect to the legal and constitutional questions as stated 
above." See, Letter to Pat Bartholomew from Brett J. DelPorto, Assistant 
13 Although the Defendants' ''establishment" claim regarding the State's 
proposed interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is not presented as 
explicitly as their "free exercise" claim under the Utah Constitution, the discussion 
of the "free exercise" clauses of the Utah Constitution intrinsically requires 
consideration of the "anti-establishment" clauses of the Utah Constitution, because 
of their dynamic interaction and tension. See, Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ 
of LPS, 2001 UT 25,21 P.3d 198, J. Durham (concurring), at ^ 42,209. 
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Attorney General, dated October 26, 2001, Add. 17. In the same letter, the 
State agreed that the resolution of the Defendants' claims under the state and 
federal constitutions "would materially affect whether the petitioners have a 
viable defense to the prosecution." Id. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State has waived any argument that the 
Defendants failed to preserve their claims under the Utah Constitution in the 
lower court and/or that the Defendants have failed to establish exceptional 
circumstances for the determination of these issues in this appeal. Thus, the 
State's strategic failure to respond to the Defendants' claims under the Utah 
Constitution in no way precludes the Court from deciding these claims on the 
merits. 
VIII The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption 
Violates The Defendants' Rights Under Article I, Sections 1 
And 4, And Article III, Section 1, Of The Utah Constitution 
The State does not challenge the Defendants' arguments that a racially 
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption 
violates the Defendants' rights under the "anti-establishment" and "free 
exercise" provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, 
of the Utah Constitution, because such a restrictive interpretation would: (1) 
interfere with the Defendant Native American Church's authority to 
determine its own membership; (2) establish de facto racial and political 
21 
qualifications for membership in the Defendant Native American Church; 
(3) subject the Defendants and other members of the Defendant Oklevueha 
Native American Church to criminal prosecution because of their "mode of 
worship", i.e. the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, and (4) 
unreasonably entangle the State in the supervision and operation of the 
Defendant Church. See, Argument, Point II, Aplnt. Br. 35-48.14 Thus., the 
Court should reject the State's racially and politically restrictive interpre-
tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption and hold that the Exemption extends 
to the nondrug, religious use of peyote by all members of the Defendant 
Native American Church in bona fide Church ceremonies, regardless of their 
race or lack of membership in a federally recognized tribe. 
IX The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption 
Violates the Defendants' Right To The Equal Operation Of 
The Laws Under Article I, Section 24, Of The Utah Constitution 
The State fails to demonstrate that its racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, is (1) reasonable; 
and (2) has more than a speculative tendency to actually further any valid 
14 The State is already contemplating litigation to establish a "definition of the 
NAC" and to determine "whether Defendants fit within it." See, Aplee. Br. 19, n. 9. 
The State fails to appreciate that the Defendant Native American Church, not the 
State, has the legal right to define Church doctrine and qualifications for member-
ship, and that the State's interference in these matters is prohibited by the 
provisions of Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article HI, section 1, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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legislative purpose; and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
legislative goal. See, Aplnt. Br. 49-56. Hence, the Court should hold that 
the State's restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates 
the Defendants' right to the Equal Operation Of The Laws under Article I, 
section 24, of the Utah Constitution, because such an interpretation would 
operate to restrict and punish, through the mechanism of the State's criminal 
prosecution system, similarly situated members of the Defendant Native 
American Church for engaging in their fundamental religious practices 
involving the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, solely on the basis 
of unrelated characteristics, including race and membership in a federally 
recognized tribe. See, Argument, Point II, Aplnt. Br. 49-56. 
X The State's Interpretation Of The Utah Statutory Exemption 
Violates The Defendants' Right To Due Process Of Law 
Under Article 1, Section 7, Of The Utah Constitution 
The State argues that, "[B]ecause the definition of'Native American 
Church' in the federal exemption incorporated in the Utah Statutory 
Exemption, is 'not free from doubt', attention must turn to the intent behind 
the regulation." Aplee. Br. 20. However, the State did not give the 
Defendant Church and its spiritual leaders, the benefit of this "doubt", when 
it prosecuted them on multiple racketeering and felony drug distribution 
charges. 
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Assuming, as the State asserts, that such a "doubt" exists, the State 
fails to counter the Defendants' argument that it was reasonable for 
Defendants to believe that their nondrug, religious use of peyote was 
protected under the Utah Statutory Exemption, based upon the fact that the 
New Mexico Court in Bovll had previously ruled that the federal exemption, 
as incorporated in the Utah Statutory Exemption, applied to all members of 
the Defendant Native American Church regardless of their race. See, f 8, 
Aplnt. Br. 16. 
To the extent that the State's racially and politically restrictive 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is correct, which Defendants 
dispute, the lower court erred in refusing to grant the Defendants' motion to 
dismiss the charges against them, because the interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption advocated by the State, renders the Exemption vague as 
applied to Defendants, in violation of their rights to due process of law under 
Article 1, section 7, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because "men and women of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," Greenwood 
v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). See, Aplnt. Br. 
56-59. Thus, the Court should either rule that the Utah Statutory Exemption 
extends to all members of the Native American Church, or rule that the 
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Defendants' reasonable reliance on Boyll precludes the State's criminal 
prosecution of the Defendants, because the Exemption failed to afford the 
Defendants reasonable notice that their conduct was prohibited. See, 
Greenwood, supra, at 819. 
XI The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation 
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Defendants' 
Rights Under The Free Exercise Clause Of The First Amendment 
A. The "Compelling Interest" Test Applies To The Analysis Of 
Utah Statutory Exemption Because It Is Not A Generally 
Applicable Law 
The Defendants claim that the State's racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates their 
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the federal 
constitution. Aplnt. Br. 59-60. Although the State argues that the "rational 
basis" test utilized in Employment Div. Pep, of Human Resources v. Smith. 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), applies to the adjudication of the Defendants" free 
exercise claim, Aplee. Br. 39, this argument is incorrect, because Smith 
involved an ostensibly "neutral, generally applicable law", whereas the Utah 
Statutory Exemption is specifically directed to religious practices of a 
particular group: members of the Native American Church, and is not a 
"generally applicable law" within the ambit of Smith. Thus, the Defendants' 
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free exercise claim must be assessed under the traditional "compelling 
interest" test. See, Aplnt. Br. 41-42 (citing cases). 
B. The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation Of 
The Utah Statutory Exemption Substantially Burdens The Free 
Exercise Of Religion Of Native American Church Members Who 
Are Non-Indian, Or Who Are Indian But Are Not Members Of A 
Federally Recognized Tribe 
The State does not dispute that its restrictive interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption would substantially burden the Defendants' religious 
beliefs, as the lower court found. Compare, Ruling, at 4, Aplnt. Br., Add. 1 
at 4; Aplnt. Br. 39, discussing Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1341-1342 (D.N.M. 
1991) (citing cases), and Aplee. Br. 37-44. Instead, the State argues that it 
has "compelling interests" which support its racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption that would 
override the Defendants' right to freely exercise their religion. Aplee. Br. 
39-44. 
C. Utah Has No "Compelling Interest" In Adopting The Racially 
And Politically Restrictive Interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption Advocated By The State 
The State characterizes the Defendants' argument as "contending that 
the State failed to prove that its racially and religiously restrictive 
interpretation of C.F.R. was the least restrictive alternative means of 
achieving the interest of the State", Aplee. Br. 38. However, the Defendants' 
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arguments are, in fact, more fundamental: (1) the Utah Statutory Exemption, 
and not the federal exemption, is at issue; and (2) the State of Utah has no 
"compelling [governmental] interest" that supports a racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption. See, Aplnt. Br. 
43-48, 59-60.15 
The State argues that it has two "compelling interests'1 which support 
its racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption: (1) protecting tribal Native Americans, i.e. members of federally 
recognized tribes, and preserving their culture and self-government; and (2) 
protecting society from illegal drug use. Aplee. Br. 9, 39-44. 
1. Obligation To Federally Recognized Tribes 
The State argues that its racially and politically restrictive interpre-
tation of the Utah Statutory Exemption as embracing only members of 
federally recognized Indian tribes, should be sustained on the basis of the 
15 The State argues that "because defendants rely on a federal exemption, they 
should be bound by the federal interpretation of the exemption", Aplee. Br. 20, yet 
the State argues that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Saenz, as affirmed in Hardman, 
is inapplicable because these cases were decided under RFRA, which only applies to 
the federal government. Aplee. Br. 30-31. This is a distinction without a difference, 
because the "compelling interest" test applicable under RFRA, is also applicable to 
the Defendants9 "free exercise" claim under Article 1, sections 1 and 4, and Article 
III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution, and the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See, Aplnt. Br. 42-43 (Utah Constitution); See, Aplnt. Br. 59-60 
(First Amendment). 
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federal government's treaties, guardian-ward relationship with, and 
concomitant duties towards, federally recognized Indian tribes. Aplee. Br. 
9-10,13-21. However, the Defendants have already established that the 
State of Utah has no such duties, and hence, no "compelling interest" in 
preferring the rights of Native American Church members who are members 
of federally recognized tribes, over the rights of Native American Church 
members who are not members of federally recognized tribes. Aplnt. Br. 13. 
Thus, the federal government's trust duties in respect to federally recognized 
tribes do not furnish any "compelling interest" for the State of Utah that 
would support a racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption. 
2. Illegal Drug Use 
The State of Utah undoubtedly has an interest in protecting society 
from "illegal" drug use, Aplee. Br. 40-41. However, that interest is not 
implicated in the instant case, because the non-drug, religious use of peyote 
by members of the Native American Church in bona fide Church services, is 
not "illegal" under the Utah Statutory Exemption. The very existence of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption manifests the "compelling interest" of the State of 
Utah, declared in Article I, Sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1, of the 
Utah Constitution, in protecting the free exercise of religion for all members 
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of the Native American Church, who might otherwise be prosecuted under 
the state's generally applicable drug laws, because of their "mode of 
worship", as referenced in Article III, section 1, of the Utah Constitution, 
including their use of peyote as a sacrament and medicine in bona fide 
Native American Church ceremonies. See, Aplnt. Br. 44, citing Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Ave, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-547 (1993) (an 
interest served by a statute is not compelling where the statutory framework 
permits derogation of that interest.) 
Moreover, the non-drug, religious use of peyote by Native American 
Church members is non-controversial. The State has presented no evidence 
to demonstrate that the religious use of peyote by members of the Native 
American Church who are non-Indian, or Indians who are not members of 
federally recognized tribes, poses any more of a "substantial threat to public 
health, safety and welfare", than similar use by members of the Native 
American Church who are members of federally recognized tribes. In fact, 
there is no such threat. In the more than 30 years since the adoption of the 
federal exemption contained in 21 C.F.R. §1307.31, the majority of Native 
American Church chapters have opened their doors to members of all races 
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and political affiliations,16 and no abuse of peyote by Native American 
Church members, Indian or non-Indian, has been reported. See, Aplnt. Br. 
43-45 and n. 13. 
The State has failed to identify any "compelling interest" of the State 
of Utah that would be undermined if the Defendants' interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption prevails. Thus, this Court should find that the 
criminal prosecution of the Defendants under the State's racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates 
their right to the free exercise of their religion under the First Amendment. 
XII The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation 
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Defendants' 
Rights Under The Establishment Clause Of The First Amendment 
In Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of LPS, 2001 UT 25, 21 P.3d 
198,202-203, this Court outlined the principles applicable to the analysis of 
a claim of unconstitutionality under the First Amendment to the federal 
constitution. The Court observed that the United States Supreme Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), explained that the Establishment 
Clause does not merely prohibit the establishment of a state Church, but 
16 See, U.S. v. Boyll, supra, at 1336 ("Historically, the church has been hospitable 
to and, in fact, has proselytized non-Indians. The vast majority of Native American 
Church congregations, like most conventional congregations, maintains an 'open 
door' policy and does not exclude persons on the basis of their race. Racial restric-
tions to membership have never been a general part of the Peyote religion or of the 
Native American Church.") 
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commands "that there should be 'no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.' Id. at 612." "Accordingly, laws that do not establish a religion but 
that are a step that could lead to such establishment", may violate the First 
Amendment." Franco, supra, at 203. 
In Franco, the Court also noted that Lemon and subsequent cases have 
employed a three part test to determine whether a government regulation or 
statute constitutes a law "respecting an establishment of religion." In order 
to survive an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon test, the 
action or law, "(1) must have a "secular legislative purpose"; (2) must 
"neither advance nor inhibit religion"; and (3) must not foster "an excessive 
government entanglement with religion." See, Franco, supra, at 203. A 
challenged action or law is valid "only if it satisfies all three parts of the 
Lemon test." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 
2577(1987). 
The State does not contest the Defendants' argument that its racially 
and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption 
violates the Defendants' rights under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Compare, Aplnt. Br. 1J5, at 4,18-20, 39-42, 59-60, and Aplee. 
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Br. 37-44.17 The State fails to present any evidence to show that its 
interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption has any valid "secular 
legislative purpose." See, Lemon, supra, at 612-613. Additionally, the 
State's proposed interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption also 
"inhibits religion", See, Id., because members of the Native American 
Church who are non-Indian, or who are Indian but are not members of a 
federally recognized tribe, cannot worship peyote as a deity or use it as a 
sacrament in bona fide Native American Church ceremonies, without being 
subjected to racketeering and felony drug prosecution by the State, as 
exemplified by the State's prosecution of the Defendants in this case. 
The State's racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption would have the sure effect of imposing a racial 
exclusion to membership in the Defendant Native American Church itself, 
because the use of peyote by Native American Church members is the 
essence of their religion. "To exclude individuals of a particular race from 
being members of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the very heart 
of the First Amendment... There can be no more excessive entanglement of 
17 Although the State claims that "Defendants made no establishment clause 
argument below and present none on appeal", Aplee. Br. 26, fn.10, this is incorrect. 
See, Memorandum In Support of Motion To Dismiss, Case No. 36 at 167-169; see 
also, Petition For Permission To Appeal An Inter-Iocutory Order, ^ [2 at 9, Add. 16, 
and State's letter to the Court agreeing to adjudication of the claims presented in 
the Petition. See, Aplnt. Br., Add. 17. 
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government with religion than the government's attempt to impose a racial 
restriction to membership in a religious organization." See, Boyjl, supra, at 
1339-1340 (citing cases). To exclude members of the Native American 
Church based on their political status, i.e. membership in a federally 
recognized tribe, would similarly offend the First Amendment. 
In the present case, the Defendant Native American Church has 
determined to open its membership to all individuals, regardless of race or 
political status regarding membership in a federally recognized tribe. As this 
Court observed in Franco, "Churches must have 'the power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government, as 
well as those of faith and doctrine.' " Franco, supra, at ^ [15, quoting Kedroff 
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should find that the State's 
racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory 
Exemption, violates the Defendants' rights under the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. 
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XIII The State's Racially And Politically Restrictive Interpretation 
Of The Utah Statutory Exemption Violates The Equal Protection 
Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment 
The State argues that "rational basis" rather than "strict scrutiny" 
review applies to the Defendants' claim that the State's racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates 
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, because the Exemption is 
allegedly "rationally related to the government's unique duty and respon-
sibility" for federally recognized tribes." Aplee. Br. 26-28. However, as 
previously discussed, the State of Utah has no such duty and responsibility. 
See, Point V, infra, at 13-15. Therefore, the racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption urged by the State, 
is not "rationally related" to any legitimate legislative purpose of the State of 
Utah, and "strict scrutiny" review is required. 
Similarly, the State's reliance on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974) ("Mancari"), to support its argument for a "rational basis" review of 
its interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption is flawed, because the 
regulation in Mancari was upheld based upon a constitutional duty expressly 
conferred on the federal government in regard to federally recognized tribes. 
Thus, the "rational basis" test of Mancari has no application to the adjudi-
cation of the Defendants' claim that the State's interpretation of the Utah 
Statutory Exemption denies them Equal Protection of the Laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The narrow scope ofMancari is further illuminated by the United 
States Supreme Court's more recent decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). There, the United States Supreme Court held 
that all race-based presumptions favorable to minorities are to be subject to 
"strict scrutiny" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 
so holding, the Court defined three basic propositions that define equal 
protection jurisprudence: "(1) skepticism - that any preference based on 
racial or ethnic criteria requires searching examination and is inherently 
suspect; (2) consistency - that the standard of review is not dependent on the 
race of those burdened; and (3) congruence - that equal protection analysis 
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution is the same as under the 
Fourteenth Amendment." See, In re Santos Y„ supra, at 1318-1320, 
discussing Adarand, supra, at 223-224. 
Adarand was decided over the dissent of Justice Stevens who noted 
that the majority's opinion basically eviscerated the Court's prior ruling in 
Mancari. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's conclusion in Mancari, that 
the BIA's hiring preference for Native Americans who are one fourth or 
more degree Indian blood and a member of a Federally-recognized tribe, 
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was "political, not racial", because it did not encompass all Indian tribes, 
was similar to the argument rejected by the majority in Adarand. where the 
Court found that the small business preference was racial, even though not 
all members of the preferred minority groups were eligible for the 
preference. See, In re Santos Y., supra, at 244-245, n.3. 
Justice Stevens also observed that Mancari's reliance on the plenary 
power of Congress to legislate on behalf of Indian tribes paralleled the 
government's unsuccessful argument in Adarand concerning the power 
granted to Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
legislate on behalf of minorities. See, In re Santos Y.. supra, at 1318-1320, 
discussing Adarand. supra, at 223-224. Thus, subsequent to Adarand. the 
courts have held that Mancari was solely concerned with issues of tribal 
sovereignty and did not support limiting an individual's free exercise rights 
based on the unrelated distinctions in political status, such as an individual's 
membership, or lack of membership, in a federally recognized tribe. 
Accordingly, the courts have limited application of the rational basis test to 
legislation involving 'uniquely Indian concerns.' The test applied is whether 
^ 
the classification serves a "compelling governmental interest" and is 
1 O 
"narrowly tailored" to achieve its goal. 
Here, the right of members of the Defendant Native American Church 
to freely practice their fundamental religious beliefs and practices involving 
the worship of peyote as a deity and sacrament, do not involve "uniquely 
Indian concerns", because many members of the Native American Church 
are not Native American Indians. Boyll supra, at 1336-1338, Aplnt. Br. fflj 
1-3, at 13-14. The fact that the membership of the Native American Church 
originally consisted only of Native American Indians, did not preclude the 
majority of Native American Church chapters from deciding to admit 
individuals of other races as members of the Church over the years. Thus, 
the fundamental precepts of religious freedom and non-interference of 
government with religion declared in the Utah Constitution must expand to 
address this social development. Fortunately, "[T]he scope of guarantees 
under the Utah Constitution is not limited by their historical roots." See, 
American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069,1073 (Utah 1985), (per 
Durham, J.). 
18 See, e.g., In re Santos Y., supra, at 1319-1323; In the Matter of Saenz. No. 00-
2166 (10th Cir. 2001), affd sub. nom., United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 
1119-1120 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Mancari was solely concerned with issues of 
tribal sovereignty and did not support limiting an individual's free exercise rights 
involving use of eagle feathers to members of federally recognized tribes); Meyers v. 
Board of Education of San Juan, 905 F. Supp. 1544,1569-1570 (Utah 1995). 
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The State has failed to demonstrate that it has both a "compelling 
interest" in adopting a racially and politically restrictive interpretation of the 
Utah Statutory Exemption, and that its restrictive interpretation of the 
Exemption is the "least restrictive alternative" of achieving any such 
compelling interest. Therefore, the Court should hold that the criminal 
prosecution of the Defendants under the States' racially and politically 
restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption, violates their 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and reverse the lower court's ruling denying the Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss on this ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks 
Native American Church of Utah and the Defendants James and Linda 
Mooney, respectfully pray that this Court find that the State's racially and 
politically restrictive interpretation of the Utah Statutory Exemption violates 
the Defendants' state and federal constitutional rights for the reasons 
discussed herein. Defendants further pray that the Court declare that the 
Utah Statutory Exemption extends to all members of the Native American 
Church, regardless of race, or political status regarding membership in a 
1R 
federally recognized tribe, and reverse the lower court's denial of the 
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the criminal charges against them. 
Alternatively, the Defendants pray that the Court declare that the 
Utah Statutory Exemption is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
Defendants, such that the State's criminal prosecution of the Defendants 
violates their rights to due process of law under Article I, section 7, of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and reverse the lower court's denial of the Defendants' Motion 
To Dismiss the criminal charges against them on this ground. 
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of 
May, 2003. 
iTHRmCQLLARD 
Attorney for Appellants--._ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of May, 2003,1 had two (2) true 
and correct copies of the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief, hand 
delivered to Ms. Kris C. Leonard and Mr. Mark Shurtleff, Office of the Utah 
Attorney General, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at their offices located at 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT, 84114 - 0854. 
iRD 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
yuii 
KATHRYN COLLARD, St. Bar No. 0697 
THE LAW FIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD, LC 
Attorney and Co-Counsel for Defendants 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: (801) 537-5625 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JAMES W. MOONEY 
aka: James W.F.E. Mooney 
7592 South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
DOB: 01/03/19444 
and 
LINDA T. MOONEY 
aka: Linda B.H.W. Mooney 
7295 South 3200 West 
Benjamin, UT 84660 
and 
OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS 
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
OF UTAH, INC., 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL AN INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER 
Subject To Assignment to Court of Appeals 
Dist.Ct. No. 001404536 
Dist.Ct.No. 00140537 
Dist. Ct. No. 001404538 
The Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church and its spiritual 
leaders, James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney and his wife, Linda Mooney, by and 
through their counsel, Kathryn Collard, hereby petition this Court for an Order pursuant 
to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, permitting Defendants to appeal 
from the interlocutory Ruling On Defendants' Motion To Dismiss issued by the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott in the above entitled cases on or about September 13, 2001, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Court has jurisdiction of an 
interlocutory appeal from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony under Section 78-2-2 (3) (h), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 27, 2000, the State, by and through the Utah County Attorney, 
charged the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., ("Oklevueha 
Native American Church"), and its spiritual leaders, the Defendants James Warren 
Flaming Eagle Mooney and his wife, Linda Mooney, with twelve first degree felony 
counts of "controlled substance criminal enterprise" pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 58-37-8, and one second degree count of racketeering or "pattern of unlawful 
activity" pursuant to Section 76-10-1603.! Conviction of each first degree felony count 
carries a penalty of not less than five (5) years imprisonment. The State also seeks a 
forfeiture of the Defendant Church and its property in Utah County pursuant to Section 
58-37-13. A copy of the Information charging the Defendants is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. 
It is undisputed that at all times referred to in the Information filed against the 
Defendants, the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church was recognized as a bona 
fide Native American Church and that the defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle 
Mooney was legally authorized to obtain peyote in Texas by the Texas Department of 
Public Safety under regulations promulgated under the auspices of the United States Drug 
1
 All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, unless 
otherwise specified. 
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Enforcement Agency. See, Affidavit of Salvador Johnson, Addendum C, attached, at 4, 
and Addendum D, Tabs 13 and 14. 
Defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney is an individual of Native 
American Indian descent. See, Affidavit of James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney, para. 
3, Addendum E, Exhibit 1 thereto.2 Mr. Mooney has a long history as a Native 
American Church member and medicine man. Defendant Mooney has received awards 
from Governor Michael O. Leavitt and the Utah Department of Corrections for his 
outstanding contributions in providing Native American religious services to inmates of 
the Central Utah Correctional Facility. Defendant Mooney has been trained and qualified 
as a police officer and has also received recognition for his efforts to assist in controlling 
the problem of unlawful drugs in the town of Hurricane, Utah, where he formerly resided. 
See, Addendum D, Tabs 2-9. Defendant Linda Mooney has also been active in bringing 
Native American religious services to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility. 
See, Addendum D, Tab 10. 
The Defendant Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., is a 
duly established non-profit corporation existing and operating under the laws of the State 
of Utah, since April, 1997, when it was founded by Defendant James Mooney, who also 
serves as its medicine man or "roadman." See, Addendum D, Tab 11. The Oklevueha 
Native American Church, like many other congregations within the Native American 
2
 Although the district court's Ruling states that "no official evidence presented to this 
Court to show that the Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage", Ruling, at 9, 
Addendum 1, this finding is incorrect and ignores Defendant Mooney's unrebutted 
sworn statements regarding his Native American ancestry contained in his Affidavit 
submitted in support of Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. Under Rule 803 (19) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, an individual's sworn statement regarding his ancestry is admissible 
and is not hearsay, even if the declarant is available. 
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Church, welcomes members of all races who embrace its fundamental beliefs and 
practices. See, Addendum D, Tab 12. See, Affidavit of James Warren Flaming Eagle 
Mooney, Paras. 3-12, Addendum E, Exhibit 1 thereto. 
All of the foregoing criminal charges against the Defendants arose from the 
conduct of the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, in providing peyote to members of 
the Defendant Oklevueha Native American Church in religious ceremonies conducted in 
the Church facilities in the City of Benjamin, Utah County, State of Utah. 
At the preliminary hearing, the witnesses subpoenaed by the State testified that 
they were either members or invited visitors of members of the Defendant Oklevueha 
Native American Church. They testified that they had received peyote from James or 
Linda Mooney in their capacity as spiritual leaders in Native American religious 
ceremonies conducted at the Defendant Church. 
The State's witnesses testified that although members of the Oklevueha Native 
American Church were encouraged to make financial donations to support the Church, 
Church members were not required to make donations to the Church, and were not 
required to make donations to participate in any Church ceremonies, including peyote 
ceremonies. Witnesses for the State also testified that the worship of peyote as a 
sacrament and deity is fundamental to the Native American religion of the Defendant 
Oklevueha Native American Church and that the Church viewed the non-religious use of 
peyote as a sacrilege. 
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges against them on 
several grounds. First, Defendants contended that they have a right to use and provide 
peyote to Church members in religious ceremonies of the Oklevueha Native American 
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Church recognized under the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Section 58-37-1 et seq., 
which incorporates the federal exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of 
the Native American Church.3 A copy of the Act is contained in Addendum D, Tab 16. 
Section 58-37-2(4) defines the term "controlled substance" as including all of the 
drugs listed in Schedules I through V of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, as well as 
all of the drugs listed in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. 
Peyote is listed as a "controlled substance" under Schedule I (2)(a) of Section 58-37-4. 
Section 58-37-4 (iii) provides that "Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, containing....(Q) peyote", is a 
Schedule I controlled substance. Schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
contains a specific exception from criminal prosecution codified at Section 1307.31 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. This regulation provides: 
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I 
does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and 
members of the Native American Church so using peyote 
are exempt from registration. Any person who manufactures 
peyote for or distributes peyote to a Native American Church 
is required to register annually and to comply with all other 
requirements of law. 
See, CFR, section 130731, Addendum D, Tab 15. 
3
 The Native American Church consists of a number of loosely affiliated local chapters. 
Each chapter is responsible for establishing its own charter. Each congregation makes its 
own rules, just as each meeting is conducted by its own roadman The "Church" refers 
to a body of believers and their shared practices, rather than the existence of a formal 
structure or a membership roll. Membership in the Native American Church derives from 
the sincerity of one's beliefs and participation in its ceremonies.... Although one 
branch of the Native American Church is known to restrict membership to Native 
Americans, most other branches of the Church do not. As a result, non-Indian members 
are accepted within the Native American Church. United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 
1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991), affd, 1992 WL 138485 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion). 
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Because the use of peyote by Native American Church members in bona fide 
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church is specifically excepted from 
criminal prosecution under Schedule I of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, this 
exception is also incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, under Section 58-
37-4 (iii). Thus, Defendants contend they areexempt from criminal prosecution under the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act for their nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious 
services as members of the Oklevueha Native American Church. 
Defendants also moved to dismiss the criminal charges against them pursuant to 
Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution and the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The Utah Constitution arguably provides for stronger 
protection for religious beliefs than the federal Constitution. Article I, Section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution, declares, in part, that "All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
... to worship according to the dictates of their own consciences," and Article 1, Section 
4, provides, in part, that 'The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof." UTAH CONST., Art. I, sees. 1, 4. The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in part, that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
Defendants argued that the free exercise of their fundamental religious beliefs and 
practices, including their use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the Oklevueha Native 
American Church, is protected under the foregoing constitutional provisions Defendants 
argued that the racially exclusive interpretation of the federal exception contained in 21 
C.F.R. 1307.31 advocated by the State, would have the effect of "imposing a racial 
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exclusion to membership in the Native American Church itself. To exclude individuals of 
a particular race from being members of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the 
very heart of the First Amendment." See, Boyll v. United States, supra, at 1340. 
Defendants also moved to dismiss the criminal charges against them on the 
ground that the State's prosecution of Defendants for providing peyote to non-Indian 
members of the Oklevueha Native American Church in Native American religious 
ceremonies, is protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in Section 1 that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
where they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. Amend XIV. In Boyll, supra, the court observed that "any attempt to 
restrict religious liberties along racial lines would not only be a contemptuous affront to 
the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion but also to the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to equal justice under the law." Id. 
Defendants also moved to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that 
they had no intent to violate the Utah Controlled Substances Act, and believed at all times 
that they had a federally protected constitutional right to use and provide peyote to 
members of the Oklevueha Native American Church in Church ceremonies based upon 
the federal peyote exemption discussed in United States v. Boyll, supra. See, Affidavit of 
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James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney, paras. 15-17, Addendum E, Exhibit 1; Affidavit 
of Linda Mooney, paras. 15-17, Addendum E, Exhibit 2. 
In Boyll, a New Mexico federal district court held that the federal peyote 
exemption applies to both Indian and non-Indian Native American Church members, and 
dismissed the prosecution of a non-Indian member of a Native American Church for use 
of peyote in Native American Church ceremonies, as a violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Boyll, the court also found 
that the very existence of the federal exemption negates the argument that the 
government has any "compelling interest" in regulating the use of peyote for religious 
purposes by Native American Church members. See also, Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of HialeaK 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct 2217, 2234, 124 L.Ed.2d. 471 (an 
interest served by a statute is not compelling where the statutory framework permits 
derogation of that interest.) 
Defendants further moved the court to dismiss the criminal charges against them 
on the ground that if the federal peyote exemption incorporated in the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act is held not to apply to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native 
American Church, the plain language of the exemption does not provide proper notice of 
this racial exclusion, such that the criminal prosecution of Defendants for providing 
peyote to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in 
that Defendants did not have reasonable notice that such conduct was unlawful. 
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Following briefing and hearing on the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss, the district 
court entered a Ruling On Defendant's (Sic) Motion To Dismiss, dated September 15, 
2001, denying the motion on all grounds. See, Ruling, Addendum A. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
1. Are the Defendants exempt from criminal prosecution for racketeering and 
distribution of peyote under the federal exemption for use of peyote in bona fidt religious 
ceremonies by members of a Native American Church incorporated in the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act? 
2. Does the State's criminal prosecution of Defendants for racketeering and 
distributing peyote to members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide 
religious purposes in Church ceremonies, violate Defendants1 right to the free exercise of 
their fundamental religious beliefs and their right to be free from any establishment of 
religion by the State under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article 1, Sections 1 and 4 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Does the State's criminal prosecution of Defendants for providing peyote 
to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide religious 
purposes, violate Defendants1 right to equal protection of the law under Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
4. If the federal peyote exemption for use of peyote by Native American 
Church members incorporated in the Utah Controlled Substances Act, is held not to apply 
to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church, does the criminal 
prosecution of Defendants for racketeering and distribution of peyote to non-Indian 
9 
members of the Defendant Native American Church for bona fide religious purposes, 
violate Defendants' right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, where the 
plain language of the exemption did not afford Defendants reasonable notice that 
distribution of peyote to non-Indian members of the Oklevueha Native American Church 
would violate the exemption and subject the Defendants to criminal prosecution under the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act? 
Standard of Review: The district court's rulings on issues of law are reviewed 
for correctness, granting no deference to the lower court's decision. Bradford v. Bradford, 
1999 UT App 373, 1J10,993 P.2d 887 (citations omitted), cert, denied, Bradford v. 
Demita, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
ISSUES RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Each of the foregoing issues was preserved in the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss 
and supporting memoranda and oral argument in the district court, true and correct copies 
of which are attached hereto as Addenda C-E. 
NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE APPEAL 
A. The Legal Issues On Which This Case Turns Involve Interpretation 
Of The State Constitution And Statutes Which Are Matters Of 
First Impression And Will Be Decided By This Court In Any Event 
The purpose to be served in granting an interlocutory appeal is to get directly at 
and dispose of the issues as quickly as possible, consistent with thoroughness and 
efficiency in the administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 
177 (1961). In this case, the disposition of the pending criminal charges against the 
Defendants turns not on factual issues, but on issues of law involving the interpretation of 
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Utah constitutional and statutory provisions which are matters of first impression that will 
ultimately be determined by this Court. Thus, by deciding these issues in the proposed 
appeal, this case and other pending cases presenting the same issues can be expeditiously 
adjudicated by the lower courts. 
B. Determination Of Pivotal Legal Issues Now Will Result In Judicial 
Economy By Avoiding Inconsistent Verdicts And Judgments 
And Multiple Appeals In Pending Cases And Avoid Further 
Unfounded Prosecutions 
In addition to the prosecution of the Defendants in this case in Utah County, other 
Native American Church members are being prosecuted in other cases in Utah County 
and in Weber County for providing peyote to members of Native American Church 
members in Church religious ceremonies. See, e.g., State of Utah v. Nicholas Stark, Case 
No. 001903155, Second District, Weber County, State of Utah, and State of Utah v. 
David Hamblin, Case No. 001402733, Utah County, State of Utah. Thus, this Court 
should resolve the pivotal legal issues common to all of these cases, in order to avoid a 
waste of judicial resources in the trials of at least three actions, and to avoid the 
inconsistent verdicts or judgments these cases may produce, as well as multiple appeals 
to this Court. Moreover, by issuing a definitive ruling on the legal issues presented by 
the proposed interlocutory appeal at this juncture, the Court will likely prevent the 
unfounded prosecution of other members of Native American Churches throughout the 
State of Utah. 
C Determination Of The Legal Issues Will Likely Result In The Dismissal 
Of All Pending Criminal Prosecutions Against Native American Church 
Members 
In the event this Court rules that the Defendants rights to provide peyote to 
members of the Oklevueha Native American Church for bona fide religious purposes in 
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Church ceremonies is protected under the Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah and 
the United States, it is highly likely that the criminal prosecutions against all Native 
American Church members, including the Defendants in this case, will be dismissed, 
thereby conserving judicial resources and sparing Church members from the continuing 
threat of criminal prosecution for exercising their fundamental beliefs and practices as 
members of the Native American Church. 
D. The Court Should Immediately Adjudicate The Legal Issues To Protect 
All Members Of The Native American Church In The State Of Utah 
From The Chilling Effect Of Threatened Criminal Prosecution On 
The Free Exercise Of Their Fundamental Beliefs 
Prior to the pending criminal prosecution, the Defendant Oklevueha Earth Walks 
Native American Church of Utah, located in Benjamin, Utah, had 200-300 participating 
members. Following the institution of criminal charges against the Defendant Church 
andits spiritual leaders, the Defendants James and Linda Mooney, and the seizure of the 
Church's sacred pipes, peyote, office equipment, membership lists and donation records 
by Utah County officials in October of 2000, members of the Defendant Church have 
been placed under intensive surveillance, interrogated regarding their religious beliefs 
and practices and threatened with criminal prosecution for participating in Church 
ceremonies which involve the worship of peyote as a sacrament and deity. 
As the result of the foregoing, members of the defendant Oklevueha Native 
American Church have been afraid to come to the Defendant Church in Benjamin, Utah, 
to associate for religious worship or to make financial contributions for fear of criminal 
prosecution by the State of Utah and the Defendant Church has been driven to brink of 
extinction. Thus, while the criminal prosecutions of Oklevueha Native American Church 
members wind their way through the "justice" system, a whole community of Native 
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American Church members within our State is being effectively chilled in the exercise of 
their fundamental religious beliefs and practices by the threat of criminal prosecution. 
Thus, it is imperative that the Court definitively answer the questions posed by the 
proposed appeal at the earliest possible time, so that Native American Church members 
within the State of Utah will have clear guidelines to enable them practice their religion 
within the bounds of law and without further government interference. 
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION 
The resolution of this case turns on a determination of the rights of the 
Defendants, a Native American Church and its spiritual leaders, to practice their 
fundamental religious beliefs, including the worship of peyote as a sacrament and 
deity,under the state and federal Constitutions and Laws. If, as Defendants assert, the 
district court has erred in its rulings on these issues, Defendants will be discharged and a 
lengthy trial on the multiple felony counts against Defendants will be averted. Thus, an 
interlocutory appeal will materially advance the termination of this litigation and should 
be granted. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD RETAIN THIS CASE 
This case involves important issues of law affecting the substantial rights of 
Native American Churches and their members to freely exercise their fundamental 
religious beliefs and practices under the Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah, as 
well as the interplay of state law and federal laws concerning these matters. 
These issues of law are largely matters of first impression which should properly 
be definitively addressed by the State's highest court because of their importance in the 
administration of justice to members of minority religious groups within a state that has a 
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fairly dominant religion, so that the lower courts, law enforcement officials, Native 
American Churches and their members, and those advocating on their behalf, have clear 
legal guidelines concerning the rights of Native American Churches and their members to 
use peyote in connection with Native American religious ceremonies without the fear of 
criminal prosecution and undue government interference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 2001. 
'KATHRgXCOLD 
Attorney and Co-Counsel foFDeffcncIants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of October, 2001, I delivered a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Petition For Permission To Appeal An 
Interlocutory Order, to Mr. David Wayment, Assistant Utah County Attorney, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, at 100 East Center Street, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah, 85606, via United States 
Mail, postage prepaid. 
lTHRY|fCOLLARD 
Attorney And Co-Counsel 
for Defendants 
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OlATE OF UTAH I I I ^ S S ^ S 
O F F I C I I O F T H E A T T O R N E Y O K N t . R A L US 
I OCT 3 0 2001 
BY: 
M A R K L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RAY HINTZE KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chiei Uectty - Oml Chief Deputy - Criminal 
October 26,2001 
Pal Barthlomew 
Court Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State #500 
PO box 140210. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
RE: State v. Oklevaeha, Supreme Court Case No. 20010787-SC 
State's Response to Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
Dear Ms. Barthlomew: 
This letter is to inform the Court that the State does not oppose granting the above-
cited petition for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether provisions of the U.S. and 
Utah Constitutions, as well as state and federal statutes, prohibit the prosecution of non-
Indian members of the Native American Church on charges of drug possession and 
distribution. The facts regarding the charges are largely undisputed, and resolution of the 
issue would materially affect whether the petitioners have a viable defense to the prosecution. 
The State therefore does not oppose the petition with respect to the legal and 
constitutional questions as stated above. 
Sincerely, 
Brett J. DelPorto 
Assistant Attorney General 
Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Division 
cc: Kathryn P. Collard, counsel for petitioner 
David H.T. Wayment, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
